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The taxation of income flows derived from foreign investment crossing national
boundaries has undergone many significant changes during the 1970s. Both host'
and home 2 countries have adopted tax policies which have affected the flows of
international income. Many of these policies were introduced with an intention of
achieving a greater degree of international efficiency and equity in the taxation
systems, and at the same time of permitting more efficient corporate tax planning.
Revenue considerations undoubtedly played an important role as well.
Canada, the United States and Mexico are all committed to the basic policy
that international business income should not be subject to double taxation, and
the policy instrument adopted to achieve this objective is their respective foreign
tax credit provisions in their taxing statutes. In the case of the United States and
Canada, this is further enhanced by the United States-Canada Tax Treaty. ' Mex-
ico has not signed any tax treaty for the avoidance of double taxation.
This article provides an overview of the taxation of foreign source income in
Canada, the United States and Mexico and provides some empirical estimates as
an example of the relative impact of a series of changes in Canadian taxation of
foreign source income on (a) the change in the Canadian tax revenues and (b) the
change in the incentive for U.S. residents to invest in Canada.
Since U.S. residents are the largest owners of foreign investments, American
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1. The host country of the investment is the jurisdiction in which the income is earned. The exact tax
treatment of business income would depend on whether the firm is a branch plant or a foreign affiliate, but
the host country usually taxes business income earned by foreign owned capital as if it were earned by a
locally owned corporation, regardless of its ultimate destination.
2. The home country of the investment is the jurisdiction of which the investor is a citizen or a tax
resident, or deemed to be a tax resident. In the case of a corporation, the home country is usually its place
of incorporation.
3. March 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983. A new and more comprehensive United States-Canada
Tax Treaty has been signed but early ratification seems unlikely because of the current U.S. concerns
about the border broadcasting disputes and certain provisions of the National Energy Program which are
seriously affecting U.S. investment in Canadian oil and gas industry.
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tax policy has dominated the issues in this field of taxation. At the same time the
host countries have become more aware that one of the greatest benefits they re-
ceive from the presence of foreign investment is the tax revenue they are able to
collect from the income generated by these investments. This issue has tended to
dominate the discussion with foreign investors in those countries where such in-
vestment has been related to the extraction of natural resources. The exception to
this general observation has been Canada, where throughout the past decade the
discussion of foreign investment has been concentrated on the real and imaginary
(and usually unquantified) benefits and costs of technological transfers, technical
and economic domination, regional job creation, and the promotion of manufac-
turing.
Accompanying the rise in the taxation of income from foreign-owned invest-
ment by host countries (exemplified in the extreme by the OPEC countries) has
been the significant attention focused on the foreign tax credit provisions of the
U.S. corporate income tax system.
I
TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME IN CANADA, THE
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
A. Some Common Characteristics
Canada, the United States and Mexico tax their residents and citizens on their
worldwide income, and provide limited foreign tax credit for taxes paid to host
countries. In all three countries, the foreign tax credit available under the tax laws
is basically the lesser of the foreign income tax paid on the foreign source income
or the domestic tax on such foreign source income. The general administrative
approach of the Revenue Departments seems to be one of restricting the availabil-
ity of the foreign tax credit by requiring a "reasonable" apportionment of several
domestic expenses and deductions to reduce foreign source income even where
there are no specific provisions in the tax laws for allocating such expenses and
deductions. This approach to tax administration would most likely lead to an
increase in the overall taxation of foreign source income and a reduction in double
taxation relief.4 Changes in January 1977 of section 861 of the Internal Revenue
Code of the United States and the regulations thereunder seem to reflect this re-
strictive attitude of the U.S. Treasury Department.
The basic principles underlying the taxation of foreign source income and the
allowance of a foreign tax credit includes the need for tax neutrality between do-
mestic and foreign investors, the recognition of the primary right of the source
country to tax income earned there, and the desire to develop an international
equity approach to taxation.
4. Where this apportionment of domestic expenses against foreign income is in excess of actual domes-
tic expenses incurred to earn foreign income, and where the foreign tax rate exceeds the domestic, then the
total world-wide taxes of the firm and the domestic taxes payable are increased by the excess expenses
multiplied by the domestic tax rate.
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B. Canada
Under section 126 of the Income Tax Act, a Canadian resident taxpayer is
entitled to a foreign tax credit against the Canadian tax that would otherwise be
payable on foreign source income. There are three important features of the for-
eign tax credit provisions which should be noted in this overview. 5 First, the credit
is computed on a per country basis rather than on a global basis as is done in the
United States.6 Since Canada treats each country as a separate unit, it thereby
limits the credit to the amount of Canadian tax on the foreign source income from
each country. Second, a distinction is made between business income tax7 and
nonbusiness income tax8 and thus separate calculations are made for foreign taxes
on the business income and the nonbusiness income arising from each country.
The distinction is an integral aspect of the credit system, because the choice of the
applicable scheme for calculations is contingent on whether a particular income
tax is characterized as a business or nonbusiness income tax. For example, a for-
eign tax credit is available only on an annual basis with no carryforward or car-
rybackward in the case of nonbusiness income tax, whereas in the case of credit for
business income tax, a five-year carryforward is permitted. 9 Third, there is a pro-
portionate limitation where the maximum credit granted -for foreign taxes paid is
the full domestic tax otherwise payable on the foreign source income. 10 The opera-
tion of this limitation means that the minimum rate of tax paid on the foreign
source income is the Canadian rate. If the foreign tax rate is less than that of
Canada, then Canada imposes a tax at the rate equal to the excess of the Canadian
rate over the foreign rate. If the foreign rate is equal to or in exess of the Canadian
rate then no Canadian tax is paid on the foreign source income. Again, in apply-
ing this limitation, separate calculation are made on a per country basis, as well as
with respect to business income and nonbusiness income taxes.
Ultimately, the fragmented method of calculating foreign tax credits may lead
to substantial uncertainty and confusion in the application of foreign tax credit
provisions. Given that multinational enterprises carry on business in several coun-
tries, it becomes necessary to determine the amount of foreign source income of
Canadian resident taxpayers from the respective host countries. The Income Tax
5. See Interpretation Bulletin IT1270, Foretgn Tax Credit and Deductions, Department of National Reve-
nue, Taxation, Nov. 17, 1975.
6. Income Tax Act § 126(1), (2), c. 63 Can. Stat. 1131 (1971) Ihereinafter cited as Income Tax Act].
7. Subsection 126(7)(a) defines "business-income tax" as any income or profits taxes paid by the tax-
payer to a foreign country or any state, province or other political subdivision of that country that may
reasonably be regarded as tax which was paid on the income from any business carried on by the taxpayer
in the foreign country.
8. Subsection 126(7)(c) defines "non-business-income tax" as any other income or profits taxes paid by
the taxpayer to a foreign country, or any state, province or other political subdivision of that country which
was not included in the computation of the taxpayer's "business-income tax". However, by virtue of sub-
section 20(11), this does not include any foreign taxes in excess of 15 percent paid on property income
earned by the individual taxpayer. In addition, the definition does not include foreign taxes on property
income or capital gains which the taxpayer chooses under subsection 20(12) to take as deduction in com-
puting his income.
9. Subsection 126(7)(b) provides a method for the calculation of "foreign-tax carryover" which in
effect allows business income tax paid in a particular year which is in excess of the amount creditable for
that year to be carried forward for a period of five years.
10. Income Tax Act § 126(1), (2).
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Act does not provide any method for determining the territorial sources of income,
but the Act requires the allocation of expenses to various territorial sources of in-
come. Subsection 4(1) requires that in the computation of the taxpayer's income
only deductions that may be "reasonably" regarded as wholly applicable to that
part of the business carried on in a particular place should be allocated to such
income. Apparently, before a Canadian resident taxpayer can allocate business
expenses, he must establish the territorial sources of income. This allocation of
expenses and other deductions among the various territorial sources in which the
Canadian multinational enterprise does business, in order to benefit from the for-
eign tax credit provisions, may lead to substantial doubts in application of those
provisions. One area where this allocation problem would create difficulties, for
example, is transfer pricing.
C. United States
Although the United States asserts its taxing jurisdiction over the foreign
source income of its citizens and residents, sections 901 and 903 of the Internal
Revenue Code grant a foreign tax credit for income taxes or taxes paid in lieu of
income taxes on the foreign source income of other countries. ' The U.S. foreign
tax credit is computed on a global basis, and thus all income from foreign sources
is totalled and a single foreign income tax credit is calculated.
In general, the U.S. citizen or resident is taxed, nominally, at the higher of the
rates charged by the host country or the United States on his foreign source in-
come. This is accomplished by subjecting patriated foreign earned income to reg-
ular U.S. tax rates, but allowing credits toward U.S. tax liabilities for income taxes
incurred abroad, limited to the amount of U.S. taxes due on the foreign source
income. t2  For countries where local income taxes are higher than those charged
in the United States, the taxpayer is left with a surplus of tax credits over and
above what can be used to offset U.S. rates on the foreign income. Where the local
rates are lower than U.S. rates, there will not be enough tax credits generated to
offset the entire U.S. tax liability. The latter situation is referred to as a deficit of
foreign tax credits. Under the rules of the U.S. foreign tax credit system, the U. S.
taxpayer may pool the tax credit surpluses earned in one country with the deficits
originating in another country. t3 The consequence is to allow U. S. taxpayers to
arrange their affairs so that their foreign source income is taxed at an effective rate
11. Internal Revenue Code sections 882 and 871 (b) impose a tax on foreign source income of foreign
corporations and nonresident aliens, respectively, that is "effectively connected" with a business in the
United States. However, section 906 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a limited form of foreign tax
credit for some foreign income taxes paid with respect to this income. Under paragraph 901(b), foreigners
are entitled to the foreign tax credit but the section 906 credit is granted only for taxes that qualify under
sections 901 and 903 and which, in addition are paid or accrued during the taxable year with respect to
income effectively connected with the conduct of business in the United States. Thus, in addition to the
special rules in section 906, the basic rules used in the ordinary foreign tax credit are applicable. In con-
trast, the foreign source income of a nonresident is not subject to Canadian tax of any kind.
12. See I.R.C. §§ 901-904 and regulations thereunder. The most thorough, though now somewhat
dated, reference work on this subject, is OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT (1961). A more recent work
on this subject by the same author is INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF- U.S. INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1980), published in three volumes by Harvard Law School.
13. Some exceptions to this rule apply to the tax credits created from taxes paid on the production of
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approximating their marginal rate on U.S. source income. This is possible because
the U.S. foreign tax credits are computed on a global basis, and thus there is only
the overall global limitation on available foreign tax credits.
The overall foreign tax credit limitation may provide an incentive for U.S.
investors, with foreign source profits that are taxed relatively highly, to take steps
to assure that all foreign taxes are creditable. For example, they may choose to
reorganize or increase their foreign investments in less heavily taxed jurisdictions,
or to engage in business activities which may increase their foreign source income
in order to lower the overall effective foreign tax rate.' 4
It should be noted that a U.S. corporate shareholder, owning at least 10 per-
cent of the voting power of a foreign corporation which has paid a dividend out of
accumulated profits, is permitted under section 902 of the Internal Revenue Code
to credit a proportionate amount of the foreign income taxes paid by the foreign
corporation on its earnings.15 This credit is usually referred to as the "deemed
paid" or indirect foreign tax credit.
In general the U.S. taxpayer has the option of treating all direct foreign taxes
paid as a deductible expense (under section 164 of the Internal Revenue Code)
rather than claiming a foreign tax credit. However, the credit is usually regarded
as being more advantageous to a taxpayer than a deduction, except perhaps where
the taxpayer suffers an overall loss.'
6
Another important difference between the U.S. and Canadian foreign tax
credit provisions is that the U.S. tax code provides general rules in section 861 for
determining territorial sources of income for the calculation of the foreign tax
credit. In addition, the regulations under section 861 provide several methods of
allocating expenses between U.S. and foreign source income.
One objective of international corporate planning is to minimize global tax
obligations by not accumulating excess, and potentially unusable, tax credits.
Some of the elements that enter into tax planning are: (i) the shifting of earnings
to low-tax countries so as to create tax credit deficits; (ii) the rechanneling of ac-
counting profits into management fees or into interest payments on intercorporate
debt;' 7 and (iii) the deferral of both the subsidiary earnings patriation and the
accompanying U.S. tax liability.
The possibility of deferring the reporting of subsidiary income as U.S. taxable
petroleum outside the United States. See BURKE & BOWHAY, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES 2913 (1979).
14. See Hammer & Chan, The US Foreign Tax Credit-New Imp/ications for Canada, 26 CAN. TAX J. 438
(1978).
15. In the United States, domestic corporations must include in their taxable income all dividends
received from foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. Such dividends are not included in taxable income of
Canadian resident corporations if paid out of active business income of foreign affiliates earned in any
country listed in subsection 5907(11) of the Income Tax Regulations.
16. Hammer & Chan, supra note 14, at 434.
17. These payments are usually taxed at rates different from those levied on dividends. In the case of
Canada, bona fide management charges or payments of interest between private parties are subject only to
the 15 percent withholding tax (reduced by treaty from the 25 percent rate dictated in Income Tax Act
section 212(1)), but not to the regular tax on corporate profits. Where a U.S. corporation borrows at home
and uses the proceeds to lend to its foreign subsidiary, the borrowing costs may be deducted against U.S.
source income. The interest payments of the foreign subsidiary reduce its taxable profits.
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income until dividends are actually paid creates a situation in which if the host
country's taxes are lower than those of the United States, the multinational corpo-
ration may gain from reinvestment of earnings in the subsidiary and postpone-
ment of the U.S. tax liability. In such a case some incentive for expansion is lost
when the host country increases its tax rates even though they remain below the
rate of the U.S. corporate income tax.1 8 The governments of countries which act
as hosts to the U.S. source investment have objectives of their own to pursue. Two
of the most important are the encouragement of economic activity in the sector
where the U.S. investment is located, and the collection of revenue from it. If
deferral of the taxation of subsidiary profits were not allowed by the U.S. Treas-
ury, and if the U.S. investor did not have surplus tax credits elsewhere, no trade-off
would exist between these two policy objectives until the host country's effective
tax rate on the income from foreign investment reached that of the United States.
The incentive given to the tax planners for U.S. investors can only be changed if
the rate of host country taxation exceeds that of the United States.
If a multinational corporation is operating in several countries and has accumu-
lated an overall excess offoreign tax credits, an increase in the income tax rates of any
one of the host countries, even if its initial rate is below that of the United States,
will result in a decrease in the incentive to invest in that country. The increase in
the host country's tax rate will increase the multinational corporation's stock of
foreign tax credits to be carried forward for future use. The present value of these
excess tax credits to the multinational corporation, however, will always be less
than their current nominal value.
In the 1970s the increased host country taxes on the activities of the U.S.-
owned oil companies resulted in a significant build up of excess tax credits by these
firms. This prompted many of these firms to diversify into other activities in coun-
tries where taxes on income were below the U.S. rates. The U.S. government's
reaction to this prospect has been both to restrict the activities to which the excess
foreign tax credits generated by the petroleum industry can be applied and to
become more strict in determining which payments are allowed as foreign tax
credits. 19
The ultimate impact of any change in Canadian, Mexican or other foreign
country's taxation on the incentive for U.S. residents to invest in the foreign coun-
try depends critically on whether or not the tax generates U.S. foreign tax credits.
It is important, therefore, to review some of the recent rulings by the Internal
Revenue Service defining what precisely is foreign tax. 20 Prior to 1976, the gener-
ally accepted definition of what constituted a creditable tax in the United States
18. If deferred taxes are reinvested in the host country, there will normally be no presen/ value cost to
the United States from deferred tax payments. Deferral aids the U.S. parent because it allows added
flexibility to patriate dividends so as to utilize more effectively its foreign tax credits.
19. The result is a set of regulations described in the U.S. Department of Treasury, News Release,
Nov. 12, 1980.
20. This review draws heavily on discussions one of the authors has had with Robert Conrad, and his
excellent review of recent changes in the U.S. treatment of foreign taxes found in Chapter V of Tax Incen-
tivesfor Foreign Invesimeni in Non-Fuel Mineral Indausres, Final Report Contract No. OA 79-4, The Office of
International Tax Affairs, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of Treasury, December 1980.
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was a foreign tax that was similar in both "structure and intent" to the U.S. tax.2 1
If a foreign tax was not creditable because it was not an income tax levied on
either a U.S. branch or subsidiary, 22 it might nevertheless be declared creditable
under the "in lieu of" provision. 23 The regulations under this provision set forth
three requirements, other than an income tax, for a payment to a foreign govern-
ment to qualify as a creditable tax.2 4 First, the country must have in force a gen-
eral income tax law. Second, the taxpayer claiming the credit must be subject to
the other tax. Third, the general income tax must not be imposed on the taxpayer.
In spite of the above provisions, there has always been some ambiguity in the
definition of creditable tax. This ambiguity has caused the greatest difficulty in
the cases of petroleum, mineral and other natural resource operations. In these
activities the mineral rights in most countries are held by the state, and as a result,
operating firms are often required to pay both income taxes and royalties (or other
production tax) to the host country. Because both tax payments are made to the
host government, it may be not clear from the structure of the tax system which
tax or part of a tax is a tax on "income" and which is a factor payment. If the
royalty is made as a payment to the owner for the extracted mineral resource, then
to declare it a creditable tax would be to allow a tax credit for wages paid to
workers in the foreign country. This ambiguity has been the subject of numerous
rulings and court cases.
The Internal Revenue Service issued three rulings in January 1978 which have
forced a review of the determinants of a creditable tax. Briefly, Revenue Ruling
78-6125 stated that the Province of Ontario Mining Tax was not a creditable tax
because expenses such as interest deductions, royalty payments to the landowner,
and exploration expenses were not allowed as deductions in computing the base.
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service stated three requirements for use in de-
termining whether or not a foreign payment was a creditable tax. 26 First, the base
of the foreign tax must be "realized in the United States' sense." Second, the tax
should be so structured as to tax only the "net" gain after its realization. Finally, a
foreign tax must be imposed on the receipt of income "rather than on transactions
such as sales or the exercise of a privilege or a franchise" ('.e. , a mineral royalty).
The three principles stated in Revenue Ruling 78-61 were expanded in Reve-
nue Rulings 78-6227 and 78-63.28. The first ruling declared a French domicile tax
to be noncreditable because it was based on "estimated" income. The latter ruling
21. For the history of this debate, see the two works by Owens, supra note 12.
22. This is covered in sections 901 and 902 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 901 states that a
U.S. citizen or domestic corportion is allowed a credit for: "the amount of any income, war profits, and
excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country or to any possession of
the United States," subject to limitations of section 904. The definition of creditable taxes in section 902 is
the same as that found in sections 901 and 903.
23. Section 903 states that: "the term 'income, war profits, and excess profits taxes' shall include a tax
paid in lieu of a tax on income, war profits, or excess profits otherwise generally imposed by any foreign
country or by any possession of the United States".
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1.
25. 1978-1 C.B. 221.
26. Id at 223-24.
27. 1978-1 C.B. 226.
28. 1978-1 C.B. 228.
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changed the Internal Revenue Service's previously held positions regarding Lib-
yan and Saudi Arabian petroleum taxes. 29 The Internal Revenue Service stated in
this ruling that a tax base determined through the use of "posted prices" was "ar-
tifical or fictitious" and therefore the tax imposed was noncreditable.
These three rulings elicited expressions of concern by several parties that the
Internal Revenue Service was, in fact, legislating new law.3 0 The Internal Reve-
nue Service stated that it would study the entire area and issue new regulations
which would clarify its position. Because of the importance of these rulings for
foreign investment income, the Internal Revenue Service issued "guidelines" for
creditability in July 1978. 3 1 The guidelines state that if a foreign government
owns the mineral rights, a tax will be creditable if the host government requires
another "payment of an appropriate royalty" and all of the following conditions
are satisfied:
(1). The amount of income tax is calculated separately and independently of the amount
of the royalty and of any other tax or charge imposed by the foreign government.
(2). Under the foreign law and in its actual administration the income tax is imposed on
the receipt of income by the taxpayer and such income is determined on the basis of arm's
length amounts. Further, these receipts are actually realized in a manner consistent with
U.S. income taxation principles.
(3). The taxpayer's income tax liability cannot be discharged from property owned by the
foreign government.
(4). The foreign income tax liability, if any, is computed on the basis of the taxpayer's
entire extractive operations within the foreign country.
(5). While the foreign tax base need not be identical or nearly identical with the U.S. tax
base, the taxpayer, in computing the income subject to the foreign income tax, is allowed to
deduct without limitation significant expenses paid or incurred. Reasonable limitations on
the recovery of capital expenditures are acceptable.
3 2
After further comment and study, temporary regulations were issued on No-
vember 12, 1980. 33 These new regulations maintain the spirit and intent of the
1978 rulings and contain several examples relating to specific technical issues. The
new regulations state that a foreign charge is a creditable tax under the provisions
of section 901 "if and only if:" (1) "the charge is not compensation for a specific
economic benefit," (2) "the charge is based on realized net income," and (3) "the
charge follows reasonable rules regarding source of income, residence or other ba-
ses for taxing jurisdiction." The regulations also state that the basis for compari-
sion in the determination of creditability is the U.S. tax system. The regulations
for section 903's "in lieu of" provision are also expanded to include a more strin-
gent "substitution" requirement as well as an additional "comparability" require-
ment. The comparability requirement seeks to ensure that the liability for the
substitute tax will not be "significantly greater than" the general income tax.
In summary, the Internal Revenue has developed more stringent requirements
29. See Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386; Rev. Rul. 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306.
30. See, e.g., Foreign Tax Credit Subcommittee, Committee on Foreign Activities of U.S. Taxpayers,
Section of Taxation, A.B.A., The Credztabity of Foreign Income Taxes. A Crit al Ana'ysis of Revenue Rulngs 78-
61, 78-62 and 78-63, 32 TAX LAWYER 33 (1978).
31. Internal Revenue Service, Department of Treasury, News Release, I.R. No. 1638, July 16, 1978.
32. Id
33. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§4.901-2 and 4.903-1, T.D. 7739, 1981-1 I.R.B. 15. The regulations also
require that the charge cannot be related to the availability of a foreign tax credit (ie. "sop up" taxes).
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for creditability of a foreign tax. This new emphasis could have a substantial effect
on the behavior of U.S. investors abroad unless host governments can change their
tax laws to conform with the new guidelines. Since all "non-creditable" foreign
charges are deductible in computing U.S. taxes, a loss of credits could mean a
reduction of up to approximately one-half the value of this charge for U.S. tax
purposes. This fact could increase the total tax bill of U.S. foreign operations and
may change the relative incentives for foreign versus domestic investment. In ad-
dition, this trend toward increased U.S. taxation of foreign investment income is
strengthened by the requirement that certain domestic expenses be deducted from
foreign investment income.
34
D. Mexico
Mexico taxes its residents and citizens on their worldwide income but does
provide limited relief from double taxation through the foreign tax credit provi-
sions of its taxing statutes. Unlike Canada and the United States, Mexico has
signed no tax treaties with any country for the avoidance of double taxation. Arti-
cle 3 of the Income Tax Act provides for the foreign tax credit with respect to
income taxes paid on the foreign source income to the host country. The credit is
limited to the lower of the foreign income tax paid or the Mexican income tax
payable on the foreign source income. The Act does not provide for the allocation
of domestic expenses to the foreign source income but the tax administrative au-
thority (Treasury Department) does require an apportionment of domestic ex-
penses that are related to such foreign source income to reduce the foreign source
income, and thus restricts the availability of the foreign tax credit.35
Overall, it would appear that Mexico does not provide the same amount of
relief from double taxation as do the United States and Canada. Mexico has no
tax treaty with any country, and in addition, the foreign tax credit provision does
not allow for carryforward or carrybackward of any excess of foreign tax credit.
The Mexican system is also governed by both the "overall" and the "country-by-
country" limitations.
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Draft Model
Treaty has been adopted by most countries as the basis for international tax trea-
ties, and is no doubt a major reason why Mexico has not entered into any such
treaties. The OECD Model Treaty has been criticized by several developing coun-
tries as having a bias toward the developed countries and as having the practical
effect of shifting a large proportion of income tax revenues, to which the develop-
ing countries seem to have a legitimate and equitable claim, from their treasuries
to those of the developed countries. 36 Because of this, it would appear that Mexico
is not inclined to enter into tax treaties with other countries unless the League of
Nations Mexican Model Treaty of 1943 is used as the basis for the treaty. The
34. Hammer & Chan, supra note 14, at 443. See also the discussion in Section IA above.
35. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO (1979).
36. See World Association of Lawyers, Committee on Taxation, The Emerging International Tax Code,lO
TAX MANAGEMENT INT'L J. 39(1977); Irish, International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taraltion at
Source, 23 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 292 (1974).
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Mexican Model Treaty was drafted with a bias for taxing income at source rather
than residence and would thus provide a model for tax treaties that would go far
in removing the adverse effects suffered by several developing countries.
It is clear, however, that a U.S.-style system of foreign tax credits effectively
results in taxation of income at source rather than residence with the proviso that
if the home country has a higher tax rate than the host country, then the home
country collects the excess tax revenues. Firms located in high-tax home countries
are then indifferent, from a taxation perspective, between investing in the home or
a low-tax host country. Alternatively, if income from operations in a host country
is taxed only at the low tax rate of that country, then the firm will have an incen-
tive to increase its investments there, and hence, increase the tax revenues of the
host country.
II
CANADIAN TAX POLICY CHANGES: EFFECTS ON TAX REVENUE AND
U.S. INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN CANADA
To illustrate the magnitude of the effects of changes in income tax policy on
the tax revenues of host and home countries as well as the incentives to undertake
foreign investments, some examples are drawn from U.S. investments in Canada. 37
Estimates in U.S. dollars of the change in Canadian tax revenues, the change in
U.S. tax revenues, and the change in total net taxes paid by foreign investors are
given for the following three policy alterations based on data for 1972 and 1974:38
A. An increase in the Canadian withholding tax rate on dividends and
branch profits from 15 to 25 percent;
B. A decrease in the Canadian withholding tax rates on dividends and
branch profits from 15 to 10 percent;
C. A reverse of the 46 to 40 percent reduction in the nominal Canadian
tax rate on corporate income from manufacturing.
A. Increase in the Withholding Tax Rate on Dividends and Branch Profits
from 15 to 25 Percent
Under the provisions of the Canada-United States Tax Treaty39 in effect at the
time of writing (the 1942 Treaty, as modified in 1950, 1956 and 1966), Canada has
been withholding 15 percent of subsidiary dividends and branch profits paid by
Canadian operations to their U.S. parents. Canadian legislation stipulates a gen-
eral withholding rate of 25 percent that is reduced by treaty between Canada and
the United States.40 If the general rate were to be applied to the Canadian source
37. The aggregate of U.S. interest, branch profits and dividends patriated from Canada in 1974, the
last year for which information broken down by industry was available, was $1,180 million. By 1978 this
had grown to a total of $1,554 million. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS-U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION 1978 (1979).
38. The estimates presented here are taken from Deutsch & Jenkins, Tax Incentives, Revenue Transfers and
the Taxatlnn of Incomefrom Foreign Investment, in TAX POLICY OPTIONS IN THE 1980s (J. Whalley & W. Thirsk
eds. 1981). Reference should be made to this paper for data sources and methodology.
39. See note 3 supra.
40. "Generally, under bilateral tax agreements, the rate of withholding tax is 15 percent, although a
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dividends and branch profit income of U.S.-based corporations, the government of
Canada would, at least in the short run, collect more revenues. The task here is to
estimate how much of these revenues would come from a decrease (through new
tax credits) in U.S. taxes paid, given that the remaining sums would come out of
the coffers of the tax paying corporations.
These amounts are estimated in Summary Table I for each of 1972 and 1974 in
two ways. The first, which uses potential tax credits for each industrial sector, pro-
vides an estimate of the maximum amount of foreign tax credits each industry
could claim based on its creditable income tax payments made outside the United
States in that year plus any carryforward of excess tax credits from the previous
years.4
The second measure of the incentive and tax transfer effects of an increase in
the Canadian withholding tax is based on the actual tax credits claimed on returns
filed. If an industry utilizes fewer tax credits than it has U.S. tax liabilities on its
foreign earned income, then the sector is classified as having a deficit of tax credits,
even if after aggregating all the companies in a sector it appears that there are
sufficient foreign tax credits to cover the deficit.
The results presented in Summary Table I indicate that increasing the Cana-
dian withholding tax to 25 percent would have led to no more than seven of
twenty-six industries experiencing an increase in overall tax liabilities in 1972,
while only three of twenty-one industries would have had their taxes increased in
1974. Canadian tax revenues would have increased by approximately $180 mil-
lion in 1972 and $193 million in 1974. The bulk (66 to 100 percent) of these funds
in each year, $119 million to $180 million in 1972, and $154 million to $157 mil-
lion in 1974, effectively would have been paid by the United States through higher
foreign tax credits being used to offset U.S. tax liabilities. Of the remainder, a
large proportion of the burden in 1972 remained with "Motor Vehicles and
Equipment" ($17 million) and in 1974 with "Petroleum Refining" ($28 million),
"All Other Mining" ($44 to 6 million) and "Wholesale Trade" ($4 million). In
each of the above cases, the lowest estimate of the tax transfer from the U.S. Treas-
ury corresponds to the case where it is assumed that all the foreign tax credits can
potentially be used to decrease the U.S. tax liability on foreign source income in
the industry.
statutory rate of 25 percent is provided for in the Act." CANADIAN MASTER TAX GUIDE 1981 (CCH
Canadian Ltd.) 13,060.
41. Because of the nature of the data base, this estimate of maximum foreign tax credits implies the
assumption that the excess tax credits of one firm within an industry could be used to offset the deficits of
another. This practice is in fact not allowed; thus this procedure underestimates the negative incentive
effect of an increase in Canadian tax rates on U.S. companies operating in Canada if the companies al-
ready have a surplus of tax credits. On the other hand, it will underestimate the tax transfer effect (from
the Canadian to the U.S. Treasury) and hence overestimate the incentive effect for these companies that
have a deficit of tax credits, when Canada raises its withholding or other income taxes. The results indicate
that U.S. companies operating in Canada tend to have a deficit of tax credits with fewer foreign tax credits
being used and more U.S. taxes being paid than would be predicted by the industry aggregates. Thus it
appears that the industry averages understate the degree to which individual U.S. companies operating in
Canada have a deficit of foreign tax credits. See Deutsch & Jenkins, supra note 35, app.
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B. Decrease in the Withholding Tax Rate on Dividends to Major Shareholders
from 15 to 10 Percent
This section investigates the consequences of withholding tax change proposed
in the 1980 Canada-United States Tax Treaty. Under these proposals, a U.S.
company owning 10 percent or more of a Canadian subsidiary would have its
withholding tax on patriated earnings reduced from 15 to 10 percent.
Summary Table II is constructed to show the impact of such a change in taxes
on the dividends and branch profits patriated from U.S.-owned affiliates in Ca-
nada. This change in tax policy results in an estimated reduction in the overall tax
burden of only six out of twenty-two industries using 1972 data and two out of
fifteen industries using 1974 data.
Canadian taxes collected are estimated to fall by $51 million using 1972 data
and $57 million using 1974 data. Assuming the use of actual tax credits, almost
100 percent of the tax savings in Canada would have to be dissipated by increased
tax payments to the United States in 1972, and 84 percent in 1974. The other 16
percent is saved by "Petroleum Refining" and "Wholesale Trade." Looking at
potential tax credits as the basis for the calculations, $24 million (47 percent) in
1972 and $42 million (73 percent) in 1974 of the savings on Canadian taxes is
absorbed by increased tax collections in the United States. Of the monies remain-
ing with the taxpayers, "Petroleum Refining" receives $16 million in 1972 and $14
million in 1974. "Motor Vehicles and Equipment" benefits by $9 million in 1972.
As above, the fact of overriding importance is the shift of taxes collected from
one government to the other. Such changes in Canadian tax policy affecting in-
come from foreign-owned investments tend to alter minimally the burden of the
ultimate taxpayers, and therefore have only a slight impact on the incentives to
carry on or to expand business in Canada.
C. Reduction in the Corporate Tax Rate on Manufacturing
The general tax rate on corporate profits, with respect to manufacturing opera-
tions only, was lowered from 46 to 40 percent in the 1972 Budget of the Govern-
ment of Canada. 42 To determine what tax transfers and business incentives were
created by this reduction with respect to U.S.-owned manufacturing in Canada,
the consequences of restoring the rate to 46 percent have been estimated below.
In calculating the earnings and profits content of dividends and the corre-
sponding foreign income taxes paid, the United States uses a last-created-first-de-
clared basis. 43 Dividends and tax credits are assumed to arise first from the most
recent year's earnings and profits and then from the preceding years' earnings and
profits if the current year's are not sufficient.
Because the Internal Revenue Service estimates foreign tax credits and taxable
income in this way, the increase in foreign tax credits available can be estimated
42. The reduction of 6 percentage points applies to Canadian manufacturing and processing profits
for 1973 and subsequent taxation years. See Interpretation Bulletin IT-145R, Department of National
Revenue, Taxation, June 19, 1981.
43. See Rev. Rul. 74-550, 1974-2 C.B. 902.
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by applying the change in the corporate income tax rate to the value of dividends
and branch profits grossed up for taxes paid. This value of increased foreign tax
credits must then be adjusted downward to account for the fact that both divi-
dends and withholding taxes will be reduced approximately proportionally as cor-
porate income taxes are increased.
Summary Table III estimates the consequences, by manufacturing industry, of
having decreased the corporate income tax by 6 percentage points for 1974. In the
absence of specific information on the subsidiaries, it is assumed that the classifica-
tion of the U.S. parent companies is identical with the activity of the Canadian
subsidiaries for tax purposes.
The values reported in Summary Table III suggest that a very high proportion
of the money lost by the government of Canada through the application of the
lower corporate tax rate to the U.S. subsidiaries ends up in the coffers of the U.S.
government in the form of additional taxes collected. This applies to $56 million
out of $72 million (78 percent) in 1974. The benefits remaining with industry
accrue to "Petroleum Refining" which captures, unambiguously, the entire net tax
benefit of $16 million in 1974. The preceding estimates of revenue loss to Canada
apply only to patriated earnings. In addition to these amounts, there is a revenue
loss due to the reduction of taxes applicable to earnings currently retained. Using
the overall retention ratio for U.S. investment in Canada of 59 percent, the total
tax loss to Canada should be approximately $175 million. 44
These results indicate that incentives arising from adjustments to corporation
income tax rates alone will be dampened if a significant proportion of the compa-
nies in the targeted industries are subsidiaries of U.S. companies. For these subsid-
iaries a reduction in Canadian corporation taxes generally results in a reduction of
foreign tax credits below the amount of U.S. tax liabilities due on this income.
Increased tax payments to the Internal Revenue Service are thereby substituted
for payments to Revenue Canada.
III
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The taxation of foreign investment by Canada, the United States and Mexico
can affect the aggregate level of investment in North America, the distribution of
this investment, and the tax revenues it generates among these countries. The
essentially bilateral nature of the taxation of the profits of foreign capital can lead
to substantial unintended effects from changes in domestic tax rates or regulations.
For example, if Canada drops its corporate tax rate to encourage both domestic
and foreign investment, then one result is the transfer of tax revenues to the United
44. See Evans & Jenkins, The Cost of UIS Dtrect Foreign Investment, Development Discussion Paper No.
104, Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University (November 1980).
Compare our figures (given in U.S. currency) to the estimated aggregate tax expenditures (in Canadian
dollars) on the reduction of tax rates on manufacturing and processing profits.
1976 $280 million
1979 $400 million
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, TAX EXPENDITURE AccouNT 37 (Dec. 1979).
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States and other countries with tax rates at or above those in Canada without any
increase in foreign investment incentives. The foreign investor still faces the same
total tax bill payable to home and host countries. The Canadian authorities
should have no particular incentive to make indirect transfers to the United States
or to any other foreign treasury; therefore, they should be reluctant to lower taxes
on foreign profits. Conversely, a foreign government can be expected to resist Ca-
nadian tax hikes.
The United States has been moving toward making it more difficult to have
foreign taxes creditable. This tends to make U.S. investment in Canada and Mex-
ico less attractive as the total taxes payable are raised. This investment disincen-
tive is further strengthened by the U.S. requirement for certain domestic expenses
to be deducted from foreign profits. Given the importance of U.S. foreign invest-
ments, both Canada and Mexico will be under pressure to align their taxation
systems with U.S. foreign tax credit requirements.
The bilateral nature of foreign investment taxation makes it a component of
foreign aid. When less developed countries seek to attract foreign investrment
through low corporate tax rates, such incentives can be neutralized by home-coun-
try taxation of the repatriated profits. The home country must establish a tax-
sparing agreement by which it forgoes taxing the newly exposed tax base in order
to make the tax cut effective. Canada and the United States must decide whether
they will agree to make such tax expenditures part of their aid packages to Mexico.
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